Bugs' Blog

• Roger Harris photographed the January 2006 MITF 30-member delegation to Venezuela. Roger's visuals illustrate the group's trips to barrios to observe the implementation of literacy, health care, nutrition and social programs; excursions to rural areas to see the achievements of recent land reform; visits with government officials to hear about goals of the administration; meetings with human rights organizations to learn of their concerns; and experiences at the Social Forum of the Americas held in Caracas.
  
  
• Susan Scott of the National Lawyers Guild will describe their conversations with representatives of Sumate, a rightwing NGO, and the ongoing legal controversies surrounding that organization's funding by the U.S. government.
  
  
• Laura Wells, Green Party candidate for state controller, will comment on her meeting with the CNE (National Electoral Council) and what she learned about Venezuela's "participatory democracy."
  
  
• Camilla Schneider will discuss the role of women in the Bolivarian Revolution.
  
  
• Dale Sorensen, MITF Director, just back from the Venezuela Solidarity Conference in Washington DC, will discuss the growing solidarity movement and actions you can take to offset the U.S. government's increasing financial support of opposition groups as a means to subvert the re-election of President Chavez in November.

HOV
4579 18th St.
San Francisco, CA 94114
Donations can also be made online by clicking here.

Friday, February 24th, 7PM
Centro Del Pueblo
474 Valencia Street
(near 16th Street one block west of 16th & Mission Bart Station)
San Francisco

With the State Department's unwarranted recent expulsion of Venezuelan diplomat Jeny Figueredo from her post as second-in-command of that country's Washington's embassy, Washington's actions lacked all proportionality and broke with diplomatic convention that, under normal circumstances, if one nation is expelling a person on the resident diplomatic list of that country, one should closely match it only with a person of comparable rank and station, as a candidate for retaliation. In this instance, the State Department decided to make its harsh point by choosing to expel the second highest ranking diplomat at the Venezuelan embassy in Washington.

While Washington is attempting to portray the Sumate trial as a case of a political vendetta by an authoritarian government against a bona fide democratic leader, the truth is that the established norm in many countries -- including in the U.S. -- is that locally-based political groups are forbidden from accepting financial contributions from foreign sources for election purposes.

The case against Plaz and Machado seems to be clear cut: Venezuela's Ley de Partidos Politicos, Reuniones Publicos y Manifestaciones (Political Party Law), which dates to 1965 contains the clause in Article 25 that parties "may not accept donations or subsidies...from foreign companies...or from foreign governments or organizations." Caracas authorities claimed, then, that the organization's acceptance and administration of a $31,000 grant from the NED was precisely that, and that Sumate's behavior in the 2004 referendum -- actions which were funded by the grant -- constituted political organizing rather than non-partisan "democracy promotion."

[W]hat Machado and Plaz admit that they have done would have been met with comparably raised legal eyebrows in the U.S., where the Federal Electoral Code expressly prohibits donations to U.S. campaigns from foreign nationals or governments. It was precisely this prohibition which was a central part of the 1997 John Huang scandal when the Democratic fundraiser was accused of funneling donations from Chinese authorities wanting favors to Democratic Party officials. Yet somehow Washington believes that similar restrictions under Venezuelan law lack comparable validity or application.

• The Committee recommended that the Government set up an “independent” commission – endorsed by those responsible for the coup d’état and the oil industry lockout of 2002-03 – to “dismantle”, proscribe or prohibit various social organizations that exercise the right to organize. These included the Fifth Republic Movement, the ruling party with a majority in the National Assembly as well as in 20 of the country’s 22 districts and 270 out of 340 local authorities (11) and the Revolutionary Youth of the MVR. The party has won nine national, regional and local elections since 1998. (12) It is noteworthy that the Committee on Freedom of Association requested the “dismantling” of Venezuela’s main political party and other legitimately constituted social organizations, which apart from being legally impossible would not be practicable.
• The Committee describes the Government’s political party as “violent”, “paramilitary” and “armed”, an assessment at variance with the reports of the international facilitating agencies (the Organization of American States and the Carter Center) that have observed recent elections in the country (see appendices). In Venezuela, neither political parties and
  movements nor occupational organizations are prohibited, and the Committee’s conclusion is therefore surprising, given that its implementation would have involved violations of
  fundamental civil and political rights.
• The Committee – without identifying the enterprises supposedly affected by discriminatory treatment – requests the Government to modify the current exchange controls system, thereby encroaching on areas of monetary and exchange policy. The system in question was adopted after a massive flight of capital that was intended to create political instability in 2002 and 2003. That flight of capital was also accompanied by shortages of basic foodstuffs and acts of sabotage against essential public services (especially domestic gasoline and natural gas supplies) which endangered the lives, health and safety of the population.

It is evident from the above that the interim conclusions and recommendations made
previously have affected the principles of impartiality, balance and objectivity required of an ILO supervisory body. The result is a set of recommendations that contradict the principles and standards of international law in this area, including those established by the Committee itself with regard to strike action, acute national crisis and essential public services.

To conclude, these conclusions and recommendations, which cannot be implemented or are
inconsistent with international law, cannot serve as the basis of a complaint against the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and the complaint must therefore be declared irreceivable.

(b) The arguments relating to economic and social policies are invalid and irreceivable because they have no relation to the rights enshrined in Conventions Nos. 87 and 98

The complainants in their arguments draw attention to economic and social policies, in
particular, exchange control and monetary measures, measures to promote small and medium-sized enterprises, inclusion in social dialogue of sectors hitherto excluded, and the development of uncultivated land, much of which had previously been occupied by individuals, despite being state property. These issues have no bearing at all on the provisions of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98.

The Government of Venezuela notes that the complainants refer to political issues, making
generic allegations (without giving any specific, documented information corroborated by evidence) and vague assertions that were set out in the employers’ communication to the Director-General of the ILO on 17 June 2004.

• With regard to the alleged discrimination in the foreign exchange controls and administration system, the measure in question was adopted by the Government in response to the massive and deliberate flight of capital which led to a reduction in international reserves and pushed the country into an inflationary spiral which adversely affected the population’s access to basic foodstuffs and services. The employers are required to meet certain basic obligations (relating to tax and social security contributions), and where delays or other problems occur, they can have recourse to the administrative and judicial authorities. At any event, given the non-specific and generic nature of the allegations, we believe that the complainants have confused the initial problems of implementing the foreign exchange controls and administration system with deliberate discrimination. Historically, similar problems led to similar measures in 1961, 1983 and 1994. The case for dismissing the complaint is supported by information contained in the appendices concerning the distribution of foreign currencies at the end of 2004 which affected all the productive sectors, including national and internationally owned enterprises.
• As regards the alleged harassment of employers, it should be emphasized that, despite the tense situations that occurred during this period, no officials of any trade union or employers’ organization were detained and no organization’s premises were broken into, except for isolated measures undertaken in accordance with decisions by the courts and the public prosecution service. These decisions are directly linked to investigations of those responsible for the coup d’état of April 2002 and the economic and oil industry sabotage of December 2002 and 2003. (14) The Conventions do not authorize or legitimize unlawful action, and indeed require the social partners to respect the basic rules of democratic coexistence. (15) The measures adopted by the police followed in all cases previous decisions by independent and autonomous public prosecution organs, and did not involve persecution or restrictions on the exercise of the rights flowing from freedom of association.
• Assertions made by the Committee regarding the supposed violation of due process exhibit certain weaknesses with regard to the principles of burden of proof and evaluation of evidence, and are not consistent with domestic or international law. The Government cannot make up arguments for the complainants, nor overlook the absence of hard evidence in the complainants’ arguments, nor can it initiate inquiries into suppositions or vague allegations decisions of the Public Prosecution Service and courts, which were challenged in the courts by some of those concerned until they finally fled the country. (17) In other cases, the situations lack the systematic character and importance claimed, mistakenly, by the original complainants. (18)
• As regards the alleged establishment of a parallel employers’ organization to weaken the more representative existing organization, the Government reiterates that the complaint makes use of generic, imprecise and unfounded arguments. At any event, the Government notes that the federation representing craftsmen, micro, small and medium-sized manufacturers in Venezuela (FEDEINDUSTRIA) was established in 1973 and has thus been in existence for 32 years; its involvement in economic policy is crucial to the creation and preservation of jobs, and furthermore is consistent with ILO guidelines including the Job Creation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Recommendation, 1998 (No. 189). Other employers’ organizations have also been founded through the exercise of the rights of participation and association in defence of the interests of micro-enterprises and entrepreneurs, in towns and in the countryside, without any threat to the existence of other associations and their members, unless the latter claim exclusive or monopolistic rights of representation.
• The complainants allege the “marginalization” of most of the existing employers’ organizations and their exclusion from social dialogue and tripartite consultation. In this regard, consultations by correspondence have been taking place since 2002 on minimum wages with FEDECAMARAS and its regional and sectoral affiliated organizations. (19) Such consultations were identical in form to those applied to the other employers’ organizations, and there was no preferential treatment. Since September 2004, these consultations, as well as covering wages, have been extended at various levels to cover areas such as immunity from dismissal. (20)
• With regard to more integrated social dialogue, always in a framework of a strategy for sustainable development and combating poverty and unemployment, the Government, after the failed coup d’état of 2002, activated social dialogue processes at the national and sectoral levels, involving employers’ organizations affiliated to FEDECAMARAS, FEDEINDUSTRIA, CONFAGAN and EMPREVEN. These led to 170 agreements in sectors such as automobiles, textiles and clothing, tourism, the social economy and small and medium-sized enterprises.
• As regards the adoption of legislation as part of an “Enabling Act” in 2000, consultations took place, in particular in August 2001, with all the sectors, in particular FEDECAMARAS and its affiliated organizations, with common timetables and methods. (21) Nevertheless, the State, having consulted various sectors with a view to ascertaining their specific interests, adopted measures which gave priority to the general public interest, especially the interests of excluded segments of the urban or rural population, and thereby demonstrated its political will to act in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the electorate which elected it. In any event, any disputes concerning the substance of the legislation in question were examined and decided upon by the Supreme Court of Justice, which made the necessary adjustments, including by declaring certain specific provisions null and void. (22)
• Following the presidential referendum of August 2004 and the regional and municipal
  elections in October 2004, a positive change was noted in the FEDECAMARAS leadership – from disregard of the will of the people, reflected at first in voices that claimed “electronic fraud”, towards an appreciation of the Government’s efforts to re-establish a climate for social dialogue with the active participation of the Executive Vice-President of the Republic and of various ministries including the Ministry of Labour. (23) In the last of these cases, we have already reported in writing on the initiatives to promote progress in consultations on the reform of the Organic Labour Act and social security legislation. (24) As a result, the leadership of FEDECAMARAS has become involved in the intensive democratic dialogue that has been taking place in the country since 1999, first on the constitutional process and then the transformation of the country’s political, economic and social model.
• In addition, the complainants add another argument, to the effect that 100,000 enterprises have been closed and jobs have been lost. Both of these are consequences of the destabilization that has occurred since December 2001, the culmination of which was the economic sabotage and oil industry lockout of 2002-03 which FEDECAMARAS actively instigated. (25) In particular, the closure of small and medium-sized enterprises as a result of this economic strangulation, and the refusal to supply raw materials and intermediate products, were deplorable occurrences.
  

In Venezuela, there is no government policy of repression directed against workers or
employers. The situations referred to confirm the will of the Government to pursue antimonopolistic
and anti-oligopolistic policies and restore the public-spirited and humanistic
dimension of economic and social relations. The structure of the Venezuelan State, and its
institutions and mechanisms for regulating the power of the State by encouraging direct citizens’
participation as an indispensable element, preclude any policy of repression of the fundamental
rights and freedoms.

Last month, Jeff Zucker, a free software advocate who has visited Venezuela several times, published an article about Venezuela's move to open source software. (For some insight into the political passions incited by anything to do with Venezuela, check out the comments appended to Zucker's story.)

I asked Zucker if there was any truth to an assertion I had seen in several places that the SAIC "sabotage" had motivated the Chavez government to push for open source. Zucker just so happens to be writing an article on this very topic. Here's what he told me:

"Yes SAIC [a US-based contractor for PDVSA] and/or INTESA [SAIC's joint venture in VZ] blocked the passwords during the walkout and did a number of other kinds of IT sabotage. Yes, PDVSA was using Windows at the time. Yes the events of the walkout were indirectly related to the eventual adoption of the open-source software law. But I wouldn't put it as simply as saying that because proprietary software was involved in the sabotage that therefore Venezuela moved to open source. Certainly the events made many in Venezuela think about the issues of computer security and that is one of the motivations of the law. But the reasons behind the open-source law are also related to the wider social and economic policies of the Chavez government -- developing a national software industry as a counter to neoliberal policies of privatization and globalization; developing computer mechanisms to support greater citizen-participation in governance and greater transparency of public agencies; broadening the base of local software developers to avoid the kind of one-source-of-IT-expertise situation that allowed the PDVSA sabotage; building bridges between the oil industry and the rest of Venezuelan society."

Although Venezuela has a history of democratic governance since 1958, the U.S. government has since 1998 made the country a major focus of its democratization strategy. According to the U.S. government, Venezuela is undergoing a political transition that is leading the country away from democracy and toward dictatorship.

The leading governmental player in U.S. "democracy-building" operations in this oil-rich nation is the U.S. Agency for International Development, a dependency of the U.S. State Department. While the State Department channels most of its U.S. democratization funds through USAID, it also underwrites virtually the entire budget of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—an organization created by the Reagan administration in 1983 as a private conduit and manager of its democratization operations. For more than two decades, the public and private face of U.S. democracy-building—USAID and NED—have shared a common strategy, namely the promotion of "free market democracies" allied with U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The recent history of USAID-NED democratization programs in Venezuela raises new questions and concerns about U.S. democratization strategy. Because of public revelations about its funding of business, political, educational, and labor organizations opposed to the elected government of Hugo Chavez, NED has been the target of most of the questions about the objectives and accomplishments of the democratization strategy.

Yet USAID, through its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), has also played a key role in the implementation of a U.S. foreign policy that has the ultimate goal of removing Chavez from power. Since 2001 the U.S. government has spent $5-7 million annually in democratization programming.

• The entire CTV assumed an active and premeditated role in designing and executing the coup against Hugo Chávez, as well as all other antidemocratic attempts to overthrow the Venezuelan president by force.
  
• The AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center provided unconditional assistance to the CTV in all of these efforts, but has refused to work with any other sector of the Venezuelan labor movement.
  
• The AFL-CIO’s program underwrites the right-wing backlash against Hugo Chávez. The choice can only be the following: either you are 100 percent for Chávez, or you are 100 percent against him.
  
• The fact that U.S. government sources fund the Solidarity Center program means that the Bush administration’s foreign policy controls the AFL-CIO agenda in Venezuela.

In 2003, the US decided to once again try the electoral route hoping the economic difficulties caused by the strike and supply shortages had softened up voters to finally oust Chavez. Millions poured into the opposition campaign via US-AID and NED.

That AFL-CIO affiliates and staff can participate in the Iraq antiwar movement is also a consequence of the laissez-faire attitude adopted by John Sweeney and the top AFL-CIO leadership. The end of the cold war and the 1995 election of the New Voices leadership ended an era of lock-step labor movement conformity to the commands of the national security state that earned the Federation the name “AFL-CIA.” Unlike the days when AFL-CIO leadership ruthlessly enforced discipline in support of anti-communist U.S. foreign policy, no such discipline exists today.

It is ironic that at this moment of great potential the AFL-CIO has abandoned its capacity for championing its own foreign policy. In its place, USLAW will try to organize a coherent labor voice for a progressive foreign policy, focused on the war in Iraq. Despite many disagreements that some USLAW affiliates have with the Federation’s policies and statements on the war, the Federation’s ties to the National Endowment for Democracy and the 2002 anti-Chavez coup in Venezuela, and other issues of international policy, USLAW refrains from directly attacking the AFL-CIO. There has developed a live-and-let-live mutual acceptance between USLAW and the AFL-CIO’s national leadership.

In 1946, members of the North American based New Tribes Mission, a
fundamentalist Protestant sect, entered Venezuela from across the Colombian
border. Posing as tourists and “curious explorers,” they settled along the Negro
River in the region known as Casiquiare. At the time, the area was used for the
exploitation of natural rubber which had not yet been replicated as a synthetic
fiber and was, as such, still a vital strategic material. The arriving
missionaries were not given a particularly warm welcome by the indigenous
peoples living in the immediate area. The Aquencwa Indians, then led by their
leader Horacio Acisa, soon began to violently resist their unwelcomed northern
visitors. . . . To carry on its ambitious work, the organization had a staff of
more than 150 including missionaries, linguists, pilots, engineers, technicians
and others. It also had its own communication network. By 1980, God’s soldiers
had 2 Bible institutes, 6 basic training camps, a linguistic institute, a radio
station, a medical center, and a housing complex for retired missionaries. Even
more impressive, New Tribes built 29 air strips from which their light aircraft
fleet operated. The airstrips and settlements all fell under their exclusive
control.

In the late 1970s, New Tribes came under heavy fire for its actions among Venezuela's indigenous populations in Amazonas. They were charged with systematically working to destroy the cultures of the Amazonas peoples. Then New Tribes personnel were accused of economic espionage: using their missions as cover to search for exploitable mineral deposits. A groundswell of Venezuelans concerned for their nation's sovereignty, including indigenous leaders, demanded that New Tribes be expelled. The government investigated the matter, but then let it drop, in part due to political pressure.

I don't know if the charges against New Tribes were ever definitively proved. At any rate, they have continued to proselytize in Venezuela and in 16 other nations. According to the New York Times, New Tribes has 3,200 staff worldwide, including 160 in Venezuela.

So, why go after New Tribes right now? Chavez accuses them of espionage in cooperation with the CIA, saying he's seen a report and video with proof. He also accuses them of eroding indigenous culture and livelihoods and of violating Venezuelan sovereignty by essentially operating as a private state. They're also said to have engaged in industrial espionage by scoping out mineral-rich areas for foreign mining companies, or 'bioprospecting' for pharmaceutical companies.

New Tribes denies all these charges, and evangelicals in the U.S. have sprung to their defense. Some indigenous Venezuelans who work with New Tribes have also spoken out against the expulsion, and even held a march in protest of Chavez's announcement.

Certainly, with dozens of private airstrips and bases throughout Amazonas and several other states (although New Tribes now says they don't have any airstrips - I'm not sure what to make of that, where did they go?), New Tribes seems well equipped to set up a secret operation, but did they? And if so, are their allegedly colonialist and illicit activities now any different than in the past? Some say it may have more to do with Pat Robertson, who set a resoundingly bad example of evangelical Protestantism when he called for Chavez's assassination on national television, than with any recently discovered actions by New Tribes.

So far, no noticeable exodus of foreign companies operating in Venezuela has
occurred. Banks and oil companies are making record profits thanks to oil
prices that have left the country, the world's fifth-largest exporter, awash in
petrodollars. This year, the oil industry is generating $20 billion for the
government, nearly $8 billion more than last year.

Still, there is restlessness in the boardrooms, with executives worried about
government intervention, which is sometimes seen as haphazard and improvised.

Economists say the government has not made the investments needed in the oil
sector. And political analysts and mainstream economists warn of recession and
dourly note that foreign investment is about a third of what it was five years
ago. They say that Venezuela's vast oil profits give the illusion of prosperity
- the economy's growth rate is 9.3 percent - but that if prices fall, or
Venezuela's growing spending catches up, the economy could founder.

For the region as a whole, growth in GDP (or income) per person -- the most basic measure of economic success or failure -- was about 80 percent from 1960 to 1979, but only 11 percent for the 1980-1999 period and a mere 3 percent for 2000-2004.